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CHOOSING JUDGES AT THE CLOSE OF THE CLINTON 
ADMINISTRATION 
Carl Tobias· 
Professor Tobias suggests that federal judicial selection is one 
important area in which ·President Bill Clinton hopes that he will 
leave a legacy. The author finds that the first Clinton Administra-
tion realized much success in choosing judges who make the federal 
judiciary more diverse and who possess excellent qualifications. 
Over the last five years, however, the Administration has not been 
equally successful either in placing highly competent female and 
minority attorneys on the bench or in filling the perennial judicial 
vacancies, partly because the Republican Party has enjoyed a sig-
nificant majority in the Senate. The author's analysis shows that 
similar circumstances existed in 1999. He, therefore, affords sug-
gestions that should enable President Clinton to appoint additional 
women and minorities, while filling the bench in his final year of 
office. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One important area in which President Bill Clinton apparently 
hopes that he will leave a legacy is the appointment of judges to the 
federal courts. When Governor Clinton was campaigning for the 
White House during 1992, the candidate pledged to name lawyers 
who would enhance balance on the federal bench, would have 
proper "judicial temperament" as well as would be intelligent, in-
dustrious, independent, and committed to the enforcement of essen-
tial constitutional rights. 1 The success that the first Clinton Ad-
ministration realized in selecting judges, who make the federal ju-
diciary more diverse and who possess excellent qualifications, sug-
gests that the President honored his campaign promises, appointing 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. I wish to thank Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions 
and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See, e.g., Bush v. Clinton: The Candidates on Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
1992, at 57-58 (reporting on the two candidates' specific responses to questions 
about the federal judiciary); Bill Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of 
Balance, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15-16. 
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unprecedented numbers of very capable women and minorities to 
the federal courts during his initial half-term.2 
Over the last five years, however, the Administration has not 
been equally successful, either in placing highly competent female 
and minority attorneys on the bench or in filling the perennial judi-
cial vacancies, partly because _the Republican Party has enjoyed a 
significant majority in the United States Senate.3 These phenomena 
applied with special force for much of 1999, when partisan political 
machinations seemingly attended the federal judicial selection 
process. Indeed, upon the Senators' return from their August recess, 
the upper chamber had approved only eleven judges, while there 
were approximately seventy openings on the appellate and district 
courts. The approach that the President assumed to naming addi-
tional women and minorities and to confirming judges for the empty 
seats, therefore, remained uncertain. Now that President Clinton 
has completed the third year of his second term, the judicial ap-
pointments process in 1999 deserves assessment. This Article un-
dertakes that effort by specifically analyzing the Chief Executive's 
simultaneous attempts to name more female and minority judges 
and to fill all of the vacancies in the federal judiciary. 4 
During 1999, the Clinton Administration instituted compara-
tively few modifications in the selection goals and practices that the 
Chief Executive and officials who were responsible for choosing 
candidates had employed over the course of their first six years in 
office. The initial section of this Article, accordingly, explores judi-
cial appointments throughout the period and emphasizes develop-
ments in 1993. I find that the President enunciated clear objectives 
and implemented efficacious procedures, particularly by seeking 
out, identifying, and nominating talented women and minorities. 
The Article then considers the selection process during the third 
year of the concluding Administration, scrutinizing the develop-
ments that were important or different. This evaluation shows that 
the Chief Executive tendered the names of numerous female and 
minority counsel who were highly qualified as well as very capable 
candidates for most of the existing appeals and district court vacan-
cies, but achieved less success in securing the nominees' confirma-
2. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm 
Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995) (stating that in the two years 
subsequent to his election, President Clinton filled over 70% of vacant judicial posts, 
ensuring greater diversity within the judiciary, and greater opportunity for women 
and minorities). 
3. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Politics: The Senate; Four Western Senate 
Races Are Too Close to Call, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1996, at A22 (noting Senate Repub-
licans possessed a six seat majority). 
4. See Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1237, 1247 n.51 (1993) (analyzing the difficulty of increasing racial diversity). 
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tion. The third part of the Article, thus, affords prescriptions that 
should enable President Clinton to name additional women and 
minorities, while filling the federal bench in his final year of office. 
II. FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE INITIAL SIX YEARS 
The appointments process during the first term and a half of the 
Clinton Administration requires comparatively brief examination in 
this Article because the relevant background has been rather thor-
oughly explored elsewhere.5 President Clinton and the officials who 
helped him in submitting candidates developed and employed effec-
tive selection practices. 
The Chief Executive and his aides articulated laudable goals for 
choosing judges and implemented measures that would promote the 
attainment of these objectives. For example, the President emphati-
cally declared that expanding the numbers and percentages of com-
petent female and minority judges would be a significant Admini-
stration priority.6 President Clinton and his assistants also worked 
closely with members of the Senate, requesting that senators find 
and suggest women and minorities with strong qualifications. 
A. Selection During the First Year 
The appointment of judges during 1993 warrants emphasis 
principally because the goals established and the practices insti-
tuted in that year were generally followed thereafter, and those 
responsible for judicial selection minimally departed from the objec-
tives and procedures. The Administration attempted to keep the 
campaign commitments the Chief Executive had made during the 
1992 campaign. For instance, President Clinton reiterated the 
pledge to name highly skilled lawyers who would increase gender, 
racial, and political diversity on the federal bench. 7 Janet Reno, the 
Attorney General, and Bernard W. Nussbaum, the White House 
Counsel, who played critical roles in choosing judges, concomitantly 
observed that the Administration would appoint attorneys who 
5. I rely in this section on Goldman, supra note 2; Sheldon Goldman & Elliot 
Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 
JUDICATURE 265 (1999); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 
49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996). 
6. See Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 
1993, at AlO. 
7. See, e.g., id. (reporting a senior White House official's statement that "'[w)e 
have spoken to each and every Democrat in the Senate and told them we expect 
their recommendations to include women and minorities'"); Susan Page, Supreme 
Matter on Home Front, NEWSDAY, Mar. 24, 1993, at 4 (stating President Clinton's 
promise to make the Supreme Court "'look like America'"); see also supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
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were well-qualified and who would enhance balance.8 The Depart-
ment of Justice and the Office of the White House Counsel, the two 
Executive Branch entities which had primary responsibility for 
helping the President, were obviously committed to these goals and 
applied efficacious processes to attain them.9 
President Clinton employed practices analogous to those Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter followed; however, the measures that the Clin-
ton Administration implemented did not differ substantially from 
those on which President George Bush and President Ronald 
Reagan had relied. 10 The Office of the White House Counsel as-
sumed principal responsibility for identifying potential nominees, 
while the Department of Justice only became actively involved once 
lawyers were considered serious candidates. 11 
Senatorial courtesy and patronage were important to nominee 
selection for the federal district courts because the Chief Executive 
and his aides usually deferred to senators who represented the ar-
eas in which judicial vacancies arose. 12 Members of the Senate typi-
cally suggested several candidates from whom the President chose a 
nominee. The President and his staff specifically requested that 
senators invoke, or revive, district court nominating commissions, 
which facilitated the appointment of women and minorities in the 
8. See White House Counsel Discusses Nation's Legal Agenda, THIRD BRANCH 
(Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1993, at l, 10 
(quoting Bernard Nussbaum that the Administration's goal in judicial appointments 
was to name "'distinguished men and women-from diverse backgrounds'" and to 
find "'individuals of experience, judgment, and good temperament'"); see also Tom 
Hamburger & Josephine Marcotty, Two Proposed for U.S. Court by Wellstone, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 10, 1993, at lA (finding that Wellstone's nominations 
conformed with Clinton's priorities of "excellence and diversity"); Al Kamen, When 
Vacancies are "Judicial Emergencies," WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al 7 (quoting 
Janet Reno, who stated that the Administration would fill judicial vacancies "'in a 
careful, thoughtful way, with excellence, diversity, and excellence in judicial tem-
perament as the criteria'"). 
9. I base this observation and much of the following discussion on conversations 
with persons who are familiar with administration selection procedures. See also 
Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to 
Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 254-55 (1997) (outlining the specific roles of the many 
individuals participating in the selection process); Stephen Labaton, Clinton May 
Use Diversity Pledge to Remake Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at Al (describing 
the process of shepherding judicial nominations). 
10. See Chris Reidy, Clinton Gets His Turn, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1993, at 69 
(stating Clinton's use of tactics similar to those used by Bush); see also supra note 9 
and accompanying text. 
11. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 254-55. 
12. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Considering Judgeships for Opponents of Abor-
tion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at Al (explaining the traditional practice of 
presidents to take recommendations from senators of their own party); Michael 
York, Clout Sought in Choosing U.S. Judges; D.C. Bar Proposes Nominating Panel, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at D3; see also supra text accompanying note 9. 
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Carter Administration, and lawmakers deployed them in many of 
the states.18 
The Chief Executive and his aides exerted more control over the 
selection of nominees for appeals court openings, but the Admini-
stration exhibited solicitude for senators from the regions where the 
empty seats existed and did not reinstitute the Circuit Judge 
Nominating Commission that President Carter had used. 14 Presi-
dent Clinton actively participated in choosing Circuit Court Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg as his initial appointee to the United States 
Supreme Court.15 
The Administration fostered the approval of candidates whom it 
tendered by informally consulting with the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee and particular senators about the candidates prior to their 
formal nominations. This activity seemed to promote the noncontro-
versial confirmation of Judge Ginsburg who, for example, had the 
support of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking Republican 
member of the Judiciary Committee.16 
The Senate also carefully exercised its power of advice and con-
sent. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which has traditionally as-
sumed considerable responsibility for the confirmation process, and 
numerous members of the Senate were responsive to the Admini-
stration's selection objectives and closely cooperated with the Chief 
Executive and his aides. For instance, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
(D-Del.), the ·Committee chair, observed that candidates must be 
diverse but that there was no "ideological blood test" for nominees 
who were considered to hold politically moderate or liberal perspec-
tives.17 Quite a few senators also revitalized district court nominat-
13. See Lewis, supra note 6, at AlO (recognizing the President's outreach to all 
Democratic senators); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text and infra note 14 
and accompanying text. 
14. See Reidy, supra note 10, at 69; see also Goldman, supra note 2, at 279. See 
generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT 
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 
(1980) (analyzing the nominating commission President Carter established). 
15. See Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. 
REV. 1861, 1870 (1994). See generally Goldman, supra note 2 (explaining the Clinton 
Administration's selection process and the extent of President Clinton's involve-
ment). 
16. See, e.g., William E. Clayton, Panel Endorses Ginsburg: Unanimous Vote 
Sends Nomination to Senate, Rous. CHRON., July 30, 1993, at 20; Martin Kasindorf 
& Timothy Phelps, In Supreme Company: Ginsburg's Nomination to Top Court is 
Confirmed, NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1993, at 23. 
17. Labaton, supra note 9, at Al; see also Lewis, supra note 6, at AlO (providing 
Senator Biden's additional observations on judicial selection). 
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ing commissions, which orchestrated the confirmation of numerous 
female and minority judges in the Carter Administration.18 
The Chief Executive undertook several special initiatives to 
search for and propose talented women and minorities. The Presi-
dent, the White House Counsel, and other influential political offi-
cers clearly and forcefully proclaimed that choosing excellent female 
and minority judges was an important Administration priority.19 
Some high level personnel, including Janet Reno, the Attorney Gen-
eral, and Eleanor Dean Acheson, the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Office of Policy Development, who had much responsibility for 
selecting nominees, are women. These public officials concomitantly 
sought and relied upon the ideas and recommendations for candi-
dates of national, state, and local women's groups, public interest 
entities, and minority political organizations.20 
A number of senators were apparently inclined to implement 
measures for identifying and suggesting female and minority attor-
neys, and the Administration's prompting may have encouraged 
additional members of the Senate to institute analogous efforts. The 
Chief Executive and his assistants requested that senators tender 
the names of female and minority practitioners and employ exist-
ing, or reinstate disbanded, district nominating panels; lawmakers 
voluntarily revived some of these commissions.21 Certain Senate 
members consulted with women's groups or minority political enti-
ties, while numerous senators proposed female and minority coun-
sel22 or relied upon advisory panels that helped recommend promis-
ing female or minority candidates.23 
18. See generally ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING 
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981) (describing 
the commissions' roles during the Carter Administration); Elaine Martin, Gender 
and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 
JUDICATURE 136, 140-41 (1987) (comparing the commissions' success in the nomina-
tion of female candidates during the Carter Administration with the Reagan Ad-
ministration's repudiation of the commission); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the 
Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 174 (1990) (commenting on the success the 
commissions enjoyed in augmenting the number of female candidates during the 
Carter Administration); see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 5-6. 
20. See generally Goldman, supra note 2, at 276-79. 
21. A senior White House official stated that the Administration told every De-
mocratic senator that "'we expect their recommendations to include women and 
minorities.'" Lewis, supra note 6, at AlO. 
22. For example, in 1993 Senators Kennedy and Kerrey proposed two women 
and one African-American for the federal judiciary. See Matthew Brelis, Donald 
Stern Given the Nod for US attorney; Women Picked for Marshal and 2 Federal 
Judgeships, BOSTON GLOBE, July 16, 1993, at 1. Similarly, Senator Graham pro-
posed-and President Clinton nominated-Rosemary Barkett for a vacancy in the 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals. See David Lyons, 11th Circuit Nominee Faces Uphill 
Battle, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 11, 1993, at 6. Senator Graham also proposed the nomination 
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During 1993, the President named to the federal bench eleven 
women and seven minorities out of twenty-eight attorneys, repre-
senting thirty-nine and twenty-five percent respectively. 24 Clinton 
correspondingly nominated eighteen women and thirteen minority 
counsel out of forty-eight attorneys, representing thirty-seven and 
twenty-seven percent respectively. 25 The numbers and percentages 
of women and minorities appointed were very unusual. 26 
Practically all of the lawyers who the Clinton Administration 
named or nominated were exceptionally well qualified. The indi-
viduals appear very intelligent, hard working, and independent, 
while they seem to have considerable integrity and balanced judi-
cial temperament.27 Quite a few of these people had been distin-
guished judges in the federal or state court systems. For example, 
Justice Ginsburg was a highly respected member of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for thir-
teen years before she joined the Supreme Court.28 
In short, President Clinton and his aides enjoyed much success 
in appointing judges during 1993. The Clinton Administration 
named and nominated numerous, very able women and minorities, 
and its record easily eclipsed those compiled in the Reagan, Bush, 
and Carter Administrations.29 The Chief Executive articulated clear 
objectives for choosing judges and instituted effective selection 
practices, especially for identifying and nominating extremely com-
petent women and minorities. 
of Stephan Mickle, an African-American, who was recently confirmed and sworn in 
as a federal judge for the Northern District of Florida. See Black Judge Joins Fed-
eral Bench; Police: Suicide was Part of Scheme; Tourist Murder Accomplice Charged, 
LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla)., June 23, 1998, at B5. 
23. See Hamburger & Marcotty, supra note 8, at lA (reporting the wide specula-
tion surrounding the advisory committee created by Senator Wellstone). 
24. Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, former Director of the Judicial 
Selection Project, Alliance for Justice (Nov. 19, 1993) (transcript on file with author). 
25. See id. 
26. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1866; see also Al Kamen, Vow on Federal 
Judges Still on Hold, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1993, at A25 (stating that President 
Carter nominated only one non-white male in his first 26 nominations). 
27. See Kassouflnterview, supra note 24. 
28. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 254-55; sources cited supra note 
12; see also Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change, Pref-
ace to Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715 
(1987) (analyzing the D.C. Circuit Court); Colloquy, The Contributions of the D.C. 
Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (1988) (reporting on a pro-
gram that reported on the D.C. Circuit Court's role in the development of adminis-
trative law); Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg Hearings Elicit Sketchy View, WASH. POST, 
July 26, 1993, at A6 (recognizing Ginsburg's 13 years on the D.C. Circuit and her 20 
years of equal rights advocacy). 
29. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 276-77. 
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This success is more compelling in light of the substantial diffi-
culties the Administration faced. The President and his aides con-
fronted the problems which all nascent administrations must en-
counter in the first year, and a few developments exacerbated these 
intrinsic complications. Perhaps most crucial, a Democrat had not 
won the presidency since 1980. The Administration, thus, had no 
recent models for appointing judges and lacked staff with relevant 
judicial selection expertise less than a dozen years old.so The Chief 
Executive and his assistants also experienced some developments 
that may have seemed unusual so early in the Administration's life. 
For instance, Justice Byron White's decision to resign from the Su-
preme Court only eight weeks after the inauguration demanded 
much effort, particularly of employees in the Office of White House . 
Counsel with responsibility for choosing judicial candidates.s1 Time 
that personnel devoted to finding an excellent replacement for Jus-
tice White was not available for identifying nominees to the appeals 
and district courts.s2 Given the problems that occurred during its 
initial year in office, the Clinton Administration compiled a fine 
·record of selection. 
B. Selection During the Subsequent Five Years 
The appointment of federal judges over the succeeding five 
years of the Clinton Presidency deserves relatively limited exami-
nation in this Article, principally because the practices that the 
Administration followed were quite similar. However, some treat-
ment of the major developments that transpired during this period 
is appropriate, as this analysis should improve comprehension of· 
the judicial selection process during 1999. 
1. Selection During 1994 
The most important feature of judicial appointments in 1994 
was the cooperative working relationship among the President and 
his assistants as well as the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Chief 
Executive and those officials who had responsibility for selection 
worked closely with the Committee, and a number of senators were . 
30. See Steve Albert, Clinton Nominates L.A. Judge for Ninth Circuit, THE 
RECORDER, Apr. 7, 1995,at2. 
31. See Joan Biskupic, Promises, Pressure in Court Search, WASH. POST, Mar. 
21, 1993, at Al (emphasizing the pressure placed on the Administration as a result 
of Justice White's retirement); Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; White An-
nounces He'll Step Down From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at 1. 
32. See Kamen, supra note 8, at Al 7. Officials in the White House Counsel's 
Office and the Justice Department also spent much energy Qn the Waco, Texas 
standoff. See David Johnston, Doubts on Reno's Competence Rise in Justice Depart-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al; see also Text of Reno's Letter Recommending 
Dismissal, WASH. POST, July 20, 1993, at All. 
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receptive to the Administration goals in choosing judges. Senator 
Biden reiterated the panel's willingness to assign judicial selection 
a very high priority.33 He also specifically requested that the Ad-
ministration steadily tender nominations, so that the Committee 
could expedite consideration, while asking the American Bar Asso-
ciation CABA) to commit the requisite resources that would permit 
timely ABA review of nominees.34 Careful cooperation apparently 
facilitated the rather noncontroversial appointment of Circuit Judge 
Stephen Breyer to the Supreme Court. Illustrative was the strong 
support that Judge Breyer received from Senator Hatch and Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), the senior Republican members of 
the Judiciary Committee.35 Numerous senate members employed or 
revived district court nominating commissions to designate, and 
foster the confirmation of, talented female and minority attorneys. 
In addition, senators proposed a number of women and minorities 
for those openings that arose. 
During 1994, the Clinton Administration appointed twenty-nine 
women and thirty-seven minorities out of 101 attorneys to the fed-
eral bench, representing twenty-nine and thirty-seven percent, re-
spectively. Moreover, the President nominated twenty-six women 
and thirty minorities out of ninety-five practitioners, representing 
twenty-seven and thirty-one percent respectively.36 President Clin-
ton again nominated women and minorities to the federal bench in 
extraordinary numbers; the statistics easily outstripped the results 
that the Reagan Administration secured and were significantly bet-
ter than the records compiled by Presidents Bush and Carter.37 
33. See Letter from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chair, U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Comm., to Chief U.S. District Judges (June 6, 1994) (copy on file with author). 
34. See id.; see also AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, THE ABA's STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 1-11 (1991) 
(discussing ABA's role). 
35. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Senators Question Breyer's Economics, WASH. POST, 
July 15, 1994, at A6 (stating that Senator Hatch defended Breyer during the confir-
mation process); Ruth Marcus, President Asks Wider Court Hunt, WASH. POST, May 
6, 1993, at All (stating that "Breyer is well regarded and liked by some conserva-
tives on the Senate Judiciary Committee, including Sens. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) 
and Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah)"); Open Minds?, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1994, at A18. 
36. See Department of Justice, Clinton Administration Judicial Record, Analysis 
of Judicial Nominations (1994) [hereinafter DOJ Record] (on file with author); Tele-
phone Interview with Barbara Moulton, former Director of the Judicial Selection 
Project, Alliance for Justice (Sept. 28, 1994) (transcript on file with author). 
37. See Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Hous. L. REV. 
137, 145 (1995); see also Debra Baker, Waiting and Wondering, Nat'l Bar Ass'n 
Mag., Jan/Feb. 1999, at 27 (noting that almost half of the judicial confirmations in 
1998 were women and minorities and that three out of every four women and minor-
ity candidates were confirmed). 
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The lawyers President Clinton appointed and nominated were 
very capable. Quite a few persons had been outstanding federal or 
state court judges. Illustrative is Second Circuit Judge Jose 
Cabranes, who rendered distinguished service on the district bench 
in Connecticut prior to his elevation and who has been a leading 
contender for appointment to the Supreme Court on several occa-
sions.38 Moreover, the American Bar Association rated as well-
qualified sixty-three percent of the Chief Executive's nominees; this 
figure was ten percentage points greater than the rankings earned 
by individuals the Carter, Reagan, and Bush Administrations 
nominated.39 
President Clinton, therefore, compiled an enviable record of 
choosing judges during his second year in office. The Chief Execu-
tive enjoyed considerable success, particularly in light of problems 
that arose during this time. For example, the Administration wit-
nessed the resignations of Philip Heymann and Webster Hubbell, 
the first Deputy and Associate Attorneys General, and Bernard 
Nussbaum, the initial White House Counsel.40 Justice Harry Black-
mun's resignation from the Supreme Court in early 1994 also 
required special efforts that otherwise would have been committed 
to filling appeals and district court vacancies.41 The continuing 
Whitewater investigation and additional difficulties simultaneously 
consumed the time and energy of officials in the White House Coun-
sel's Office and the Justice Department who actively participated in 
the appointments process. 
2. Selection During 1995 
The most significant aspects of judicial selection during 1995 
were several alterations in the procedures that the Clinton Admini-
stration had employed throughout the initial two years.42 The Re-
publican Party's recapture of the Senate in the 1994 congressional 
38. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Cabranes Said to Top High Court List, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 8, 1994, at Al. 
39. See DOJ Record, supra note 36; Al Kamen, Cutler to Face Backlog in Seating 
Judges, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1994, at Al7; Henry Reske, Judicial Vacancies De-
clining, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 24. 
40. See, e.g., David Johnston, Reno's Top Deputy Resigns Abruptly, Citing Differ-
ences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at Al (discussing Heymann's resignation); Justice 
Aide Leaves Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at Al5 (discussing Hubbell's resigna-
tion); Nussbaum Out as White House Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, § 1, at 1 
(discussing Nussbaum's resignation). 
41. See Biskupic, supra note 38, at Al; On the Short List, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 
1994, at C6 (discussing possible nominees to replace Justice Blackmun). 
42. Much below is based on conversations with individuals who are familiar with 
the Administration's practices, on Goldman, supra note 2, at 278-79, and on Gold-
man & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 254-57. 
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elections apparently prompted these changes. For instance, al-
though the Office of White House Counsel and the Department of 
Justice continued to share primary responsibility for judicial selec-
tion, White House officials seemed to have an enhanced role, espe-
cially in identifying nominees. White House personnel appeared 
considerably less willing to forward nominees who could prove con-
troversial and evinced greater willingness to compromise.43 For ex-
ample, President Clinton failed to resubmit the names of several 
persons he had nominated during 1994 and who seemingly were 
controversial,44 and the White House Counsel publicly declared that 
the Administration would not proffer attorneys whose candidacies 
could promote confirmation fights.45 
The Chief Executive and his aides continued to consult infor-
mally on possible nominees, while they attempted to cooperate 
closely with Senator Hatch when he became the chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1995.46 Senator Hatch accorded candidates 
treatment that was analogous to the consideration that Senator 
Biden afforded President Reagan's nominees during his seventh 
year in office. Senator Hatch stated that the Committee would ap-
prove every individual who was "qualified, in good health, and un-
derstands the role of judges,"47 and throughout 1995 the Committee 
43. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 
255-57. 
44. See Joan Biskupic, Facing Fights on Court Nominees, Clinton Yields, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at Al (stating that Clinton withdrew two nominees because of 
fears Senate Republicans would oppose them); Neil A. Lewis, In Selecting Federal 
Judges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at 
A20 (observing Clinton's speed in "drop[ping] judicial candidates if there is even a 
hint of controversy"); Ana Puga, Clinton Judicial Picks May Court the Right, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1 (stating that Clinton may have to nominate more 
conservative attorneys than he had previously in order for his nominees to gain 
confirmation in a Republican Senate). 
45. See Biskupic, supra note 38, at Al; see also Henry J. Reske, A New White 
House Counsel, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 32; Mikva Moves from Courthouse to White 
House, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, 
D.C.), Sept. 1994, at 1. See generally Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 255-57 
(reporting a statement by Assistant Attorney General Eleanor Dean Acheson that 
the Administration decided not to engage in confirmation fights because they were 
"not worth the time and resources"). 
46. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 317-18; see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 
9, at 255-57 (noting Senator Hatch's "substantial professionalism" and his commit-
ment in working with the Clinton Administration on judicial nominees); Senator 
Orrin Hatch Looks at Courts, Legislation, and Judicial Nominees, THIRD BRANCH 
(Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1995, at 1, 10. 
47. Goldman, supra note 2, at 290; accord Neil A. Lewis, New Chief of Judiciary 
Panel May Find an Early Test With Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A31. 
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acted in this manner.48 The panel typically conducted confirmation 
hearings on one appellate court candidate and three or four district 
court nominees each month that Congress was in session.49 
During 1995, Pref?ident Clinton named seventeen female attor-
neys and eight minority lawyers out of fifty-three judges, represent-
ing thirty-two percent and fifteen percent, respectively.50 The 
American Bar Association highly rated the individuals who received 
nomination and confirmation.51 An illustrative case was Seventh 
Circuit Judge Diane Wood who had previously been a faculty mem-
ber at the University of Chicago and a Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in the Justice Department. 52 The record compiled was ad-
mirable, given the complications that the Clinton Administration 
encountered, some of which apparently resulted from the Republi-
can Party's majority in the Senate. 
3. Selection During 1996 
During 1996, the President and his aides essentially followed 
the procedures that they had deployed over the course of the preced-
ing year. The White House appeared to have additional responsibil-
ity for the judicial selection process, exhibited greater willingness to 
compromise, and was particularly sensitive to the problems that 
presidential election-year politics presented. These complications 
were probably exacerbated because Senator Bob Dole (R-Kan.), who 
ultimately captured the Republican Party nomination for president, 
was also serving as the Senate Majority Leader until he resigned in 
June. Senator Dole, therefore, may have slowed Senate considera-
tion of candidates because expediting nominations could have sug-
gested a lack of confidence in his own presidential ambitions. 
Between January and July, only three people secured confirma-
tion, even though the Senate Judiciary Committee had approved 
twenty-six nominees.53 During July, the Republican and Democratic 
48. See generally Gary A. Hengstler, At the Seat of Power, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, 
at 70 (discussing various reforms proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch). 
49. See Al Kamen, Window Closing· on Judicial Openings, WASH. POST, June 12, 
1995, at Al 7. 
50. Telephone Interview with Deborah Lewis, former Director of the Judicial 
Selection Project, Alliance for Justice (Jan. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with author); 
see also Tobias, supra note 5, at 314. 
51. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 315. 
52. See, e.g., Janan Hanna & John O'Brien, Phelan: Firm "Very, Very Viable" 
Despite Loss of Key People, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1995, at B3: John Flynn Rooney, New 
7th Circuit Judge Seen as More Liberal Member, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 3, 1995, 
at 1. 
53. I rely substantially in this paragraph on my telephone interview with Mike 
Lee, former Director of the Judicial Selection Project, Alliance for Justice (Sept. 3, 
1996) (transcript on file with author) and Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 257-
58. 
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political party leadership struck a compromise by agreeing to con-
duct floor votes on one nominee each day. In 1996, therefore, the 
Clinton Administration named five female counsel and four minor-
ity attorneys out of twenty judges, representing twenty-five and 
twenty percent respectively.54 The Senate confirmed very capable 
nominees. For example, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima 
had been a distinguished jurist in the Central District of California 
prior to his elevation.55 The judicial appointments record which the 
President compiled for 1996 was commendable in light of the sub-
stantial problems posed by election-year politics. 
In sum, during the Clinton Administration's initial term, it 
seemed to honor the pledges regarding judicial selection that Gov-
ernor Clinton had made when campaigning for president and 
achieved the objectives for judicial appointments which had been 
created. The President placed 202 lawyers on the federal courts; 
sixty-two (thirty-one percent) of those judges are women and forty-
seven (twenty-eight percent) are minorities.66 Again, these numbers 
and percentages are unparalleled, continuing the Clinton Admini-
stration's record as clearly superior to those compiled by the three 
prior administrations. For instance, President Clinton appointed 
more women from 1993 until 1995 than the Bush Administration 
named during an entire term and than the Reagan Administration 
chose in eight years.67 Moreover, the American Bar Association gave 
the Clinton nominees the highest rankings since the Bar Associa-
tion began assessing the competence of candidates in the 1950s.68 
4. Selection During 1997 
During, the first year of the concluding term, President Clinton 
and his assistants essentially employed the selection objectives and 
processes that they had used during the initial term that I evalu-
ated above.69 The goals and practices that the Administration de-
ployed more closely resembled those followed in the third and 
fourth years than the first half-term, primarily because the Repub-
lican Party enjoyed a 55-45 majority in the Senate after the 1996 
congressional elections. For example, the White House continued 
exercising major control, that was seemingly enlarged and consoli-
54. Lee Interview, supra note 53. 
55. See Albert, supra note 30, at 2; Henry Weinstein, Clinton Nominates L.A. 
Judge to U.S. Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at Bl (referring to the Los 
Angeles district judge as "highly regarded"). 
56. See supra notes 21-22, 33, 47, 50 and accompanying text. 
57. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 314; see also Goldman, supra note 2, at 280, 286. 
58. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 315; see also Lewis, supra note 44, at A20; 
Robert A. Stein, For the Benefit of the Nation, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 104. 
59. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 265-68; see also supra notes 2-56 
and accompanying text. 
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dated, over nominee identification and most choices for the appeals 
courts, while it exhibited some deference to senators' suggestions 
for openings on the district courts.60 The Administration concomi-
tantly maintained special efforts to identify and submit, capable 
female and minority candidates. For instance, the President ten-
dered the names of an African-American, a Latino, and two women 
for four Ninth Circuit vacancies before August 1997.61 
The Clinton Administration encountered complications in con-
firming judges promptly during 1997, but the Chief Executive and 
the Republican Party leadership share responsibility for these prob-
lems. For example, President Clinton probably forwarded too few 
individuals whom Republican senators found palatable in the early 
part of the year and seemed to submit nominees somewhat erratic-
ally later in 1997. More specifically, a number of the twenty-two 
candidates whose names the Chief Executive tendered on January 7 
were apparently not acceptable to Senator Hatch or other members 
of his party,62 while the President forwarded thirteen people on July 
31 immediately before the Senate recessed, a phenomenon that may 
have frustrated expeditious Committee processing.63 
The Republican Party leadership shares responsibility for cer-
tain delays in confirming candidates. For instance, Senator Hatch 
could have expended greater energy to expedite Judiciary Commit-
tee consideration of nominees, although the Chair asserted that the 
delay resulted from the Administration's sporadic submission of 
candidates, some of whom were controversial.64 Moreover, Senator 
Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the Senate Majority Leader, occasionally 
60. See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 
935, 951-52 (1998); see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 265-68; Goldman & 
Slotnick, supra note 5, at 265. 
61. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President 
Clinton Nominates Twenty-Two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997) (renominating 
Margaret McKeown and Richard Paez); White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, 
President Clinton Nominates James S. Ware to the Federal Bench (June 27, 1997); 
White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Susan Graber 
to the Federal Bench (July 30, 1997). 
62. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 268; see also Tobias, supra note 60, 
at 952; Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A15. ' 
63. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Thirteen to the Federal Bench (July 31, 1997); see also 143 CONG. REC. S2515, 
S2523-24 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (discussing reasons 
to assess nominees cautiously). 
64. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch); Hatch, supra note 62; see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 267-69. 
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failed to schedule floor debates and votes promptly once the Judici-
ary Committee approved the individuals.65 
In 1997, the Chief Executive named six female attorneys and 
five minority lawyers out of thirty-six judges, representing seven-
teen and fourteen percent respectively.66 President Clinton corre-
spondingly nominated nineteen women and twelve minorities for 
sixty-one vacancies, representing thirty-one and twenty-one percent 
respectively.67 The numbers and percentages of female and minority 
counsel confirmed and nominated are similar to comparable statis-
tics compiled four years earlier.66 Again, the appointees and nomi-
nees were exceptionally well qualified; while several of the judges 
whose names the President submitted had been placed on the trial 
courts by Republican chief executives.69 
In short, President Clinton and his assistants who had selection 
responsibilities enjoyed a respectable record of choosing judges dur-
ing 1997. The Chief Executive and those aides continued to name 
and nominate highly competent female and minority practitioners. 
The success realized was even more remarkable, given the general 
difficulties encountered in establishing a second administration 
while also replacing officials who had previously played major roles 
in judicial selection. 10 
5. Selection During 1998 
The attorneys the Clinton Administration appointed· and nomi-
nated during 1998 were very qualified persons who had rather 
moderate political perspectives and who would further increase 
gender and racial balance on the federal bench. For instance, the 
ABA accorded the nominees strong ratings. Furthermore, numerous 
candidates had previous experience in the federal or state judiciar-
ies. 71 The Chief Executive forwarded the names of some people who 
were affiliated with the Republican Party and orchestrated the ele-
65. See Dan Carney, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. 845, 847 (Apr. 10, 1999); Goldman & 
Slotnick, supra note 5, at 267, 271-73; Tobias, supra note 60, at 953. 
Gp. See Telephone Interview with Stephan Kline, former Director of the Judicial 
Selection Project, Alliance for Justice (Nov. 21, 1997) (transcript on file with author). 
67. See id. 
68. See supra notes 5-31 and accompanying text. 
69. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Sonia Sotomayor to the Federal Bench (June 25, 1997); see also White House's Office 
of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates James S. Ware to the Federal Bench 
(June 27, 1997); infra note 72 and accompanying text (confirming Judge Sotomayor). 
70. For example, the White House Counsel as well as the Deputy and Associate 
Attorneys General resigned and required replacement. See Tobias, supra note 60, at 
954. 
71. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Twelve to the Federal Bench and One to the D.C. Court of Appeals (Jan. 27, 1998) 
(providing the judicial experience of the nominees). 
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vation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who President Bush had ap-
pointed to the district court.72 
The objectives and practices President Clinton and his assis-
tants used closely resembled the goals and procedures that they had 
employed previously.73 For example, the White House continued to 
assume primary responsibility for identifying nominees, particu-
larly for appellate court openings, and additionally consolidated its 
control. The Administration concomitantly maintained the practice 
of deferring to the recommendations of senators for nominations 
involving district court openings in their home states. 
The President and his staff made numerous special efforts to 
identify, and tender the names of, extraordinarily talented women 
and minorities. 74 The White House was instrumental in securing the 
appointments of Susan Graber, 75 Margaret McKeown, 76 and Judge 
Kim Wardlaw,77 as well as pressing for the confirmation of Marsha 
Berzon and Judge Richard Paez,78 to. Ninth Circuit vacancies in 
1998. White House and Justice Department personnel cooperated 
closely with members of the Senate and requested that they identify 
and recommend competent female and minority candidates. 
Although the President and his aides experienced certain diffi-
culties in facilitating confirmation during the second year of his last 
term, these complications resembled those encountered over the 
preceding three years and especially during 1997. 79 These problems, 
however, can be attributed to numerous persons and institutions 
who participated in the selection process. The individuals and enti-
ties include the Chief Executive and his staff, the Senate Judiciary 
72. See Shannon P. Duffy, Clinton Announces Nominees for Eastern District 
Court, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1; Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate 
Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B3 (discussing 
the delay in Judge Sotomayor's nomination). 
73. See, e.g., supra Parts II.A., 11.B.1-4. 
74. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
75. See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, A Clinton Judiciary Sampler,, 82 
JUDICATURE 268, 269 (1999) (discussing the Clinton White House nominees). 
76. See id. at 270. 
77. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Twelve to the Federal Bench and One to the D.C. Court of Appeals (Jan. 27, 1998) 
(announcing Judge Wardlaw's nomination). 
78. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, Press Briefing by Joe Lockhart 
(Sept. 22, 1999) (discussing the White House's tenacity in nominating Paez and 
Berzon, despite numerous delays). 
79. See generally Goldman, supra note 2, at 276 (discussing the obstacles facing 
the Clinton Administration's judicial appointments); Goldman & Slotnick, supra · 
note 9, at 254 (outlining the difficulties faced during the confirmation process); To-
bias, supra note 60, at 942-43, 954 (examining the difficulties Clinton faced in his 
first and second terms); supra notes 41-54, 58-64 and accompanying text. 
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Committee and its chair, the Senate Majority Leader, and individ-
ual senators, particularly members of the Republican Party. 
The Administration was apparently responsible for some of the 
difficulties that accompanied judicial selection. Early in 1998 Presi-
dent Clinton could have undertaken greater efforts to submit addi-
tional nominees whom Republican senators could support; the Ad-
ministration tendered candidates rather sporadically thereafter. 
For instance, the Chief Executive frequently forwarded the names 
of more than one person at the same time, a practice that might 
have complicated the Judiciary Committee's attempts to consider 
nominees expeditiously. 
The Grand Old Party (GOP) leadership in the Senate and spe-
cific Republican members of that body also had some responsibility 
for the relatively slow pace of appointments, especially at the be-
ginning of 1998. For example, Senator Hatch might have reviewed 
nominees more promptly, although he blamed the Administration's 
irregular submission of nominees for slowing the process. Moreover, 
some of these nominees proved unacceptable to him or to other Re-
publican senators partly because of the possibility that they would 
be "judicial activists."80 The Senate Majority Leader did not invaria-
bly schedule floor debates and floor votes on candidates immedi-
ately after they had secured Judiciary Committee approval.81 It, 
therefore, appears that all of the major participants in the appoint-
ments process might have expended greater effort to improve judi-
cial selection. Only forty judges received confirmation by September 
1998, although cooperative efforts involving Senator Hatch and 
President Clinton accelerated the pace of appointments during the 
remainder of the year. 
In 1998, the Clinton Administration named twenty-one women 
and eighteen minorities out of sixty-five lawyers to the federal 
courts, representing thirty-two and twenty-eight percent respec-
tively. 82 The numbers and percentages of women and minorities ap-
pointed correspond to those for 1995.83 All persons confirmed appar-
80. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S6186 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (defending the Senate's role); see also 144 CONG. REC. S659 (daily ed. Feb. 
11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (defending nominee Margaret Morrow against 
the accusation that she was a judicial activist); Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nominee 
Confirmations Smoother Now, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A. 
81. See 144 CONG. REC. S8477 (daily ed. July 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (expressing concerns over the delay in Judge Sotomayor's confirmation); 
Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 9, at 272-73 (exploring the average delay between 
receipt of a nomination and the hearing); The Senate's Hostage Game, L.A. TIMES, 
July 28, 1998, at B6 (discussing the delay in Sotomayor's nomination). 
82. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT ANNUAL REPORT 
(1998); Kline Interview, supra note 66. 
83. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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ently have strong qualifications. The judges seem very intelligent, 
diligent and independent, while they evince integrity and balanced 
judicial temperament. Most of the individuals have comparatively 
moderate political viewpoints, and a few of them are associated 
with the Republican Party. Some of the appointees and nominees 
had prior, valuable experience on the federal or state court judiciar-
ies. Illustrative is Federal District Judge Kim Wardlaw, whom 
President Clinton elevated to the Ninth Circuit.84 
In short, the Administration compiled a fine record during 1998. 
The President continued to appoint and nominate significant num-
bers of talented women and minorities, while the Chief Executive 
and his aides articulated clear goals for choosing judges and fol-
lowed efficacious practices. The success attained is striking in light 
of the major obstacles confronted by the President. In fairness, the 
Administration contributed to certain of these difficulties, such as 
the intensified Whitewater probe and the impeachment inquiry.85 
III. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN 1999 
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the judicial selection 
process during 1999 was the recurrent nature of many develop-
ments. Notwithstanding the comparative success in appointing 
judges that President Clinton and Senator Hatch had realized only 
the year before, another impasse arose over the seventy-seven ap-
pellate and district court seats that remained empty.86 The Chief 
Executive and his assistants correspondingly honored selection 
goals, and followed practices, which were similar to those that they 
had employed over the previous six years. 
The Clinton Administration submitted a package of seventeen 
appeals and district court nominees immediately after the initial 
session of the 106th Congress convened and as the President's im-
84. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Twelve to the Federal Bench and One to the D.C. Court of Appeals (Jan. 27, 1998) 
(outlining Judge Wardlaw's experience). 
85. See Carney, supra note 65, at 847; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 5, at 265 
(outlining the "hostile political environment" impeding appointments); Charles F.C. 
Ruff, Lewinsky Probe Has 'Impact' on President, WASH. POST, May 28, 1998, at A16 
(reprinting a declaration by White House Counsel regarding the Paula Jones and 
Independent Counsel investigations); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 
22, 1998) (interviewing Sen. Lott). 
86. See 145 CONG. REC. Sl0,848 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (expressing outrage over the delay in Richard Paez's nomination); John Heil-
prin, Hatch Will Go Slow on Nominees, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al (dis-
cussing Sen. Hatch's control over the pace of the confirmations); Vacancies in the 
Federal Judiciary, Apr. 1, 2000 (last visited Apr. 21, 2000) 
<http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy .htm>. 
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peachment trial before the Senate was about to commence.87 Sena-
tors approved two judges for openings on the Northern District of 
Illinois in March.88 Nonetheless, the Judiciary Committee held no 
hearings on any of the other nominees for the seventy vacancies 
before the summer of 1999 and the Senate had approved only eleven 
judges as late as September, although thirty-four judges ultimately 
secured confirmation by the year's end.89 
The principle obstacle to judicial appointments during the first 
half of 1999 seemingly was a controversy caused by an opening on 
the federal district bench in Utah, the home state of Senator 
Hatch.90 Earlier in the year, the Judiciary Committee Chair started 
"demanding that the [P]resident nominate a conservative aide to 
Republican Gov[ernor] Mike Leavitt as a federal judge in Salt Lake 
City."91 The dispute apparently worsened because Senator Hatch's 
choice was a "self-described Ronald Reagan conservative whose 
views on the environment are anathema to Clinton and to environ-
mental groups and other liberal groups that are politically impor-
tant to the administration" and because numerous Utah Democrats 
vociferously criticized the candidate's possible nomination.92 Presi-
dent Clinton eventually honored the request of the Senator by sub-
mitting the individual's name for consideration in July.93 These 
machinations seemed to preclude the confirmation of any nominees 
other than the judges approved for the Northern District of Illi-
• 94 
no1s. 
87. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, The President Nominates Seven-
teen to the Federal Bench (Jan. 26, 1999) (providing the names and brief biographies 
of the nominees). 
88. See 145 CONG. REC. S3438 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (approving of Judges Hibbler and Kennelly). 
89. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, 13TH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1999). 
90. See Joan Biskupic, Hatch, White House at Impasse on Judgeships, WASH. 
POST, June 5, 1999, at Al (discussing Sen. Hatch's retaliatory act of halting confir-
mations); Carney, supra note 65, at 845; Paul Elias, Berzon's Ninth Circuit Bid 
Looks Good, THE RECORDER, June 17, 1999, at 1 (reporting the resumption of con-
firmations' success after Clinton agreed to nominate Stewart); Judy Fahys, Utahn is 
Bottleneck in U.S. Judge Pipeline, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 17, 1999, at Al (discussing 
the halt in nominations caused by Ted Stewart's nomination); David G. Savage, 
Federal Benches Left Vacant Over Utah Tug of War, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at Al 
(discussing the stall in confirmations). 
91. Savage, supra note 90, at Al; see also Biskupic, supra note 90, at Al; Fahys, 
supra note 90, at Al. 
92. Savage, supra note 90, at Al; see also Carney, supra note 65, at 845-47; 
Elias, supra note 90, at 1 (outlining the controversy over Stewart's nomination). 
93. See White House's Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Petrese B. Tucker and Brian Theodore Stewart to the Federal Bench (July 27, 1999); 
see also Carney, supra note 65, at 845. 
94. See Biskupic, supra note 90, at Al (outlining the severity of the Stewart 
dispute); Elias, supra note 90, at 1 (discussing the "bottling upn of the confirmation 
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Several related matters may have concomitantly delayed judi-
cial selection. For instance, early in 1999, President Clinton ap-
peared to tender rather irregularly an insufficient number of nomi-
nees whom Republican senators deemed palatable. Senator Hatch 
correspondingly conducted virtually no hearings or committee votes 
on candidates prior to niid-June. Of course, the Senate impeach-
ment trial essentially suspended the confirmation process. Slowed 
judicial appointments can, therefore, be attributed to most of the 
people and institutions that participated in choosing judges. 
The Clinton Administration enunciated objectives, and relied on 
procedures, which were analogous to the ones used over the prior 
six years. For example, the White House had the primary responsi-
bility to identify individuals, especially for appellate court vacan-
cies, and exercised increased control over the selection process. The 
President and his aides continued undertaking special efforts to 
delineate and forward the names of talented female and minority 
practitioners, while they closely cooperated with senators and urged 
the legislators to recommend such candidates. The White House 
orchestrated the appointments of Marsha Berzon and Judge Rich-
ard Paez to the Ninth Circuit.95 
Despite the complications recounted above, in 1999 President 
Clinton appointed to the federal courts thirteen women and ten mi-
norities out of thirty-four lawyers, representing thirty-eight and 
twenty-nine percent.96 The numbers and percentages of female and 
minority practitioners who secured confirmation were comparable 
to those named in 1995.97 All of these judges are extremely well 
qualified, while exhibiting intelligence, industry, independence, 
integrity as well as appropriate judicial temperament. Numerous 
appointees had previously served with distinction on federal or 
state courts. The jurists seem to have relatively moderate political 
perspectives, and a small number have links to the Republican 
Party. Illustrative of judges who had some Republican Party affilia-
tion and prior judicial service is Seventh Circuit Judge Ann Claire 
Williams whom President Clinton elevated from the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. 98 
process); Fahys, supra note 90, at Al (discussing the "Stewart dispute" between 
Clinton and Hatch); Savage, s~pra note 90, at Al (examining the stall in the confir-
mation process). 
95. See Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays, Senate Confirms 2 Judicial Nominees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at Al6. 
96. See Telephone Interview with Nancy Marcus, former Director of the Judicial 
Selection Project, Alliance for Justice (Mar. 17, 2000) (transcript on file with au-
thor). 
97. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
98. See Matt O'Connor, True to Herself; Though She Feels Indebted to Black 
Judges who Paved the Way, Ann Claire Williams is a Trailblazer Herself, CHI. TRIB., 
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In short, the Chief Executive and his assistants attained con-
siderable success during the third year of the concluding Clinton 
Administration. The President continued to name and nominate 
numerous talented female and minority counsel, while he and his 
aides articulated clear selection goals and applied efficacious proce-
dures for achieving their objectives. Their accomplishments are 
rather striking, given the substantial obstacles encountered. The 
'President had responsibility for certain of these difficulties, such as 
the impeachment trial. Republican members of Congress, however, 
also contributed to the situation, as a few Republican senators did 
not facilitate judicial selection as much as they might have. In the 
end, the actions of the Chief Executive and his staff were admira-
ble. Nevertheless, they must redouble those efforts and consider 
implementing the ideas below if President Clinton is to realize addi-
tional success in appointing women and minorities and is to fill the 
federal bench during his final year in the White House. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FINAL YEAR 
Recommendations related to the goals that the Clinton Admini-
stration should pursue and how the President and those responsible 
for judicial selection might attain the objectives require compara-
tively little exploration in this Article. A number of suggestions 
have been proffered elsewhere,99 and some concepts have been ex-
amined above. Moreover, the Chief Executive and his assistants 
have enunciated praiseworthy goals and implemented effective pro-
cesses for realizing them. Perhaps most importantly, 2000 is a 
presidential election year, traditionally a time when sitting Chief 
Executives have experienced the greatest difficulty in securing their 
nominees' confirmations and judicial appointments have slowed in 
·anticipation that ·a new administration will assume responsibility 
for selection. 
A. Why President Clinton Should Appoint More Women and 
Minorities 
President Clinton should attempt to continue naming substan-
tial numbers of women and minorities because many of these indi-
viduals will bring diverse viewpoints to judicial service. Such judges 
could enhance their colleagues' comprehension of controversial pub-
lic policy questions, such as abortion, discrimination, and affirma-
Dec. 11, 1999, at 1 (describing the career of Judge Ann Claire Williams and her 
ascent to the bench of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit). 
99. For discussions of proposed goals of the Clinton Administration regarding 
judicial nominations, see Goldman, supra note 2, at 276; Goldman & Slotnick, supra 
note 5, at 265; Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 
1257, 1274-85. 
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tive action, which the Third Branch must address. 100 Confirming 
more female and minority judges might help to combat gender, ra-
cial, and ethnic bias in the federal courts.101 Considerable evidence 
correspondingly indicates that the American citizenry has greater 
confidence in a federal judiciary whose constitution reflects the 
population of the United States.102 Numerous women and minorities, 
such as Chief Judges Harry Edwards of the District of Columbia 
Circuit and Stephanie Seymour of the Tenth Circuit, have been out-
standing members of the federal bench. 103 Enlarging the numbers of 
female and minority judges may be one significant sign of a Chief 
Executive's commitment to enhancing conditions for women and 
minorities in the country, in the federal courts, and in the practice 
of law. 104 
A concomitant reason for naming additional female and minor-
ity practitioners is the need to rectify or ameliorate the lack of g~n­
der, racial, and political diversity on the current federal bench, al-
most half of whose membership Presidents Reagan and Bush ap-
pointed.105 African-Americans comprised fewer than two percent of 
the judges the Reagan Administration selected, while President 
Bush chose only one Asian-American and nine Latino judges.106 
These Republican Chief Executives apparently placed some attor-
100. See, e.g., Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising it Higher?: Af-
firmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. 
& PoL'y REV. 270, 272 (1983) (maintaining that recruiting minorities and women 
can help offset past underrepresentation in the judiciary); Marion Z. Goldberg, 
Carter-Appointed Judges-Perspectives on Gender, TRIAL, Nov. 1990, at 108. 
101. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (Apr. 2, 1990); 
NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS (1997). See 
generally Hon. Bruce M. Selya, First Circuit: A Study of Gender Bias In and Around 
the Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 647 (1998) (discussing the development of a "court 
user" survey to examine gender bias in the judicial system). 
102. See Tobias, supra note 99, at 1276; see also Slotnick, supra note 100, at 272-
73. Certain research also indicates that numerous female and minority judges could 
improve decisionmaking. See Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversifica-
tion in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Court of Appeals, 56 J. POL'Y 425 
(1994); see also Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional 
Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 279 (1997); Tobias, supra note 99, at 1262-64 
(recognizing that this hypothesis is controversial). 
103. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 1244; see also Carl Tobias, More Women Named 
Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477, 483 (1991) (listing other outstanding women 
who have served or are serving on the federal bench). 
104. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1876; Tobias, supra note 103, at 483; see also 
Tobias, supra note 18, at 175-76. 
105. See Carney, supra note 65, at 845; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 5, at 283. 
106. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 
JUDICATURE 282, 287, 293 (1993) (displaying charts depicting judicial appointees 
since the Johnson Administration); Tobias, supra note 4, at 1237. African-Americans 
comprised 5.2% (ten out of 192) of President Bush's appointees. See Goldman, supra, 
at 287, 293. 
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neys on the bench at least in part because they held conservative 
political perspectives.107 
It is problematic that the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
appointed such a small number of women and minorities because 
the Presidents were able to select judges from larger, more experi-
enced, pools of female and minority counsel than could President 
Carter. The United States had only 62,000 female lawyers in 1980, 
while 140,000 women were practicing law by 1988.108 Many female 
attorneys, for example, have pursued challenging careers in the 
Department of Justice, public interest organizations, private law 
firms, and the legal academy. 109 The size of the African-American, 
Latino, and Asian-American bar membership correspondingly ex-
panded from 23,000 during 1980 to 51,000 in 1989, while minority 
practitioners have participated in numerous stimulating activities, 
such as the filing of landmark voting rights cases or the production 
of cutting-edge scholarship. 110 
Another important reason for choosing more female and minor-
ity judges is the need to fill all of the current federal court vacan-
cies, thus enabling the judiciary to operate with the complete con-
tingent of judges who Congress has authorized. Appointing lawyers 
to these empty seats would facilitate the resolution of criminal 
cases, and decrease the significant civil backlogs in district courts, 
while permitting appellate judges to address the expanding number 
of appeals with greater expedition. m Increasing the number of ap-
pointments would also end what the presidents of seven national 
107. See Carney, supra note 65, at 846-47; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 5, at 
284; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1264-74. 
108. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 1241 n.22. 
109. See id. at 1246-47, 1280-81; see also Tobias, supra note 15, at 1875; Tobias, 
supra note 103, at 485. See generally Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The 
Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of 
Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2299 (1992) (criticizing the legal academy for 
failing to hire qualified women); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, 
Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1997) (finding modest results for affirmative action pro-
grams). 
110. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT ANNUAL REPORT 3 
(1992); see also Carl Tobias, supra note 4, at 1280-81; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1875. 
See generally both Merritt and Reskin articles, supra note 109. 
111. In 1994, some 220,000 civil cases were pending, and 14,658 had been pend-
ing for over three years. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT 
MID-YEAR REPORT 4 (1994); see also David Savage, Clinton Missing Opportunity on 
Court Vacancies, Some Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at A5 (suggesting civil cases 
backlogged because of vacancies on the bench); Robert Schmidt, The Costs of Judi-
cial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 28, 1997, at 6 (attributing civil backlog to delayed 
judicial selection). 
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legal associations described as a "looming crisis in the Nation" dur-
ing 1997.112 
B. How President Clinton Can Appoint More Women and 
Minorities 
Recommendations for how President Clinton and officials with 
primary responsibility for selecting judges 'could choose additional 
talented female and minority attorneys for the federal courts de-
serve comparatively little exploration here. Numerous, similar sug-
gestions have been provided elsewhere, 113 while the Chief Executive 
and those who work with him seem committed to naming more 
women and minorities, and have implemented efficacious processes 
to attain this objective. 
Certain recommendations can be proffered, nevertheless. Presi-
dent Clinton and the individuals who are responsible for judicial 
selection may want to evaluate effective ways of redoubling their 
laudable efforts to seek out, designate, and appoint extremely capa-
ble female and minority counsel. The President and Administration 
personnel might elaborate previous endeavors, consider new means 
of proceeding, and capitalize on resources which they have yet to 
deploy. 
The choice of Supreme Court Justices and appellate judges re-
quires less assessment because the White House continues to exer-
cise substantial control over vacancies involving those positions. 114 
The President and the White House Counsel, therefore, should en-
sure that White House staff understand the need to name more 
women and minorities to the federal bench and invoke the finest 
measures for realizing this goal. Actions that the Administration 
instituted during its initial seven years show that the personnel 
appreciate the objective and have adopted efficacious ways to 
achieve the goal. 
The selection practices for district court judges warrant greater 
examination, as the Chief Executive has deferred to senators from 
the areas in which vacancies arise when he nominates attorneys for 
these openings. The lawmakers' predilections, or the encourage-
ment of the Administration, has seemingly led some members of the 
Senate to adopt new, or employ existing, practices for identifying 
and fostering the candidacies of talented women and minorities as 
well as to recommend numerous female and minority practitioners. 
President Clinton should express appreciation to those senators 
112. See Letter from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, to William J. Clinton, Presi-
dent (July 14, 1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. 88,504 (daily ed. July 31, 1997). 
113. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 5, at 284; Tobias, supra note 4, at 
1245-49, 1274-85. See generally Goldman, supra note 2, at 276. 
114. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279; Tobias, supra note 5, at 316-17. 
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who have helped him attain the Administration's objectives; the 
Chief Executive could then contact specific members of the upper 
chamber who have not yet fostered the Administration's objectives, 
asking that they propose women and minorities. 115 Moreover, the 
President could use mechanisms, such as commissions, which will 
seek out, and promote the nomination of, these qualified individu-
als. President Clinton also might reiterate publicly his determina-
tion to name numerous female and minority judges. 
The President and his assistants should work cooperatively 
with all legislators who serve on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
especially its Chair, by consulting with them on nominees. The 
aides and senators could concomitantly secure help from additional 
sources who will know competent female and minority lawyers. 
Those staff and lawmakers might seek assistance from institutions, 
namely bar associations, which may offer certain types of help. Less 
traditional sources, including women's organizations or minority 
political groups, could also prove more valuable in this effort than 
traditional sources. The Chief Executive must also invoke the help 
of every fem ale senator because each legislator can persuade other 
members of the Senate to propose more female and minority attor-
neys and assist the administration in advancing potential nominees' 
candidacies. 
The qualifications and networking of women and minorities, 
who presently'constitute about one-fourth of the legal profession in 
the United States, will be critical. Nearly as significant could be the 
efforts and contacts of female and minority Cabinet members, in-
cluding Labor Secretary Alexis Herman and Transportation Secre-
tary Rodney Slater; of women and minorities throughout the federal 
government, such as Deputy Assistant Attorney General Beth 
Nolan; and of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who chaired the American 
Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession.us 
C. A Word About Politics and Filling the Federal Bench 
The above examination of judicial selection during 1999 sug-
gests that the comparatively small number of judges named and the 
relatively few female and minority lawyers who secured confirma-
tion can be ascribed primarily to political considerations. Neglecting 
the effects of politics on the appointments process generally or on 
the choice of women and minorities specifically would be impracti-
cal. Moreover, the influence of political factors will increase sub-
115. See supra note 21 (quoting a· White House official who said the Administra-
tion expected that all Democratic senators would suggest women and minorities). 
116. See Carl Tobias, supra note 4, at 1248-49. 
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stantially over the course of the Clinton Administration's final year 
in office. 
It is difficult to predict precisely how political phenomena might 
affect judicial appointments, especially the selection of women and 
minorities during 2000. For example, a crucial element of the calcu-
lus that Republicans and Democrats must assess will be the pros-
pects for each party's Presidential nominee to capture the White 
House. Senators on both sides of the aisle will correspondingly be 
circumspect about actions that the electorate might interpret as 
evincing insufficient confidence in their respective candidates for 
the Oval Office. More specifically, most Republican members of the 
Senate, who control the upper chamber, will want to leave a sub-
stantial number of judgeships vacant so that the GOP presidential 
contender, George W. Bush, if triumphant, can fill the empty seats. 
Democratic senators may wish to confirm judges for numerous 
openings as a hedge against the possibility of a Republican victory. 
Democrats will correspondingly appreciate that the Chief Execu-
tive's authority is weakest during the final year of an administra-
tion, a situation that the impeachment controversy has probably 
accentuated. Indeed, Professors Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slot-
nick, two astute observers of federal judicial selection, aptly sum-
marized most of these concepts: "successfully appointing federal 
judges, particularly those at the circuit court level, will be increas-
ingly difficult for a lame duck (and wounded) post-impeachment 
Clinton presidency entering a presidential election year."117 
The above ideas will apparently have several important ramifi-
cations for federal judicial selection in 2000. First, the appointment 
of judges will gradually slow throughout the year and may well 
abruptly halt after the summer nominating conventions. Second, 
those judicial candidates receiving confirmation will be individuals 
who are acceptable to Republican as well as Democratic members of 
the Senate, a phenomenon that will place a premium on moderation 
and willingness to compromise. More specifically, the overwhelming 
majority of Republican Senators are most likely to support those 
nominees whose political perspectives they perceive are rather con-
servative. 
These propositions suggest that President Clinton and his assis-
tants must carefully consider how they can best continue to appoint 
capable female and minority judges and attain other important ob-
jectives, such as promptly filling all seventy-seven of the present 
vacancies on the federal bench. 118 The President and Administration 
117. Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 5, at 278; accord Carney, supra note 65, at 
847. . 
118. See Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Apr. 1, 2000 (last visited Apr. 21, 
2000) <http:www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy .htm>. 
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personnel may wish to evaluate and employ certain approaches. 
One straightforward notion would be to nominate candidates, a 
number of whom are well qualified women and minorities, for each 
current opening. The Chief Executive could correspondingly force 
the issue of delayed selection by using the Presidency as a bully 
pulpit to shame or criticize Republican senators, or. by relying upon 
recess appointments. 119 Moreover, the Administration might con-
sider allowing the GOP to recommend some nominees in exchange 
for Republican approval of Democratic nominees or for the enact-
ment of a new judgeships bill. 120 
The ideas explored earlier indicate that President Clinton 
should closely reexamine the goal of confirming numerous compe-
tent female and minority lawyers as well as additional objectives, 
namely filling the empty seats, at some point during his last year in 
office. For instance, the Chief Executive may want to weigh, and 
even balance, these significant purposes. This might specifically 
mean that the practice-whereby a larger proportion of second-term 
appellate court "appointments have gone to white males at the ex-
pense of nontraditional candidates"121-will become prevalent dur-
ing 2000. Indeed, the "moderation, compromise, and accommodation 
[that] have been paramount in the [A]dministration's appointment 
behavior"122 may well be more pronounced in its waning days, as the 
President approaches the nadir of his authority. 123 
V. CONCLUSION 
President Clinton and his aides with responsibility for choosing 
judicial nominees compiled a commendable record of selection dur-
ing the first seven years of his Administration. The Chief Executive 
and his aides articulated admirable goals and implemented effica-
cious means for attaining the objectives. The Administration placed 
unprecedented numbers and percentages of talented female and 
minority judges on the courts. If the President and those who assist 
him redouble these efforts, they could appoint more women and 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane) 
(holding that a recess appointee can exercise the judicial power of the United 
States); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use 
of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 
(1984) (explaining the Chief Executive's power to make recess appointments and 
examining the constitutional legitimacy of the mechanism). 
120. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 5, at 271. 
121. Id. at 283. 
122. Id. at 284; accord Carney, supra note 65, at 847. 
123. I do not champion these ideas. The President must be pragmatic about filling 
vacancies and must assess their significance generally and in specific courts, even 
though he may conclude that filling the seats is less important than naming more 
women and minorities. 
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minorities and even fill the vacancies on the federal bench during 
the final year of the Clinton Administration. 
